Clean Energy as Security Policy: Why Europe’s Energy Union Matters Now

Europe’s clean energy transition is often discussed as a climate obligation or a competitiveness play. But there’s a third lens that’s becoming impossible to ignore: security.

Energy security is no longer just about having enough fuel for winter. It’s about whether Europe can keep essential services running, protect critical infrastructure, and shield households and industry from geopolitical coercion and price shocks. In that context, the clean energy transition isn’t simply a decarbonisation pathway—it’s a strategic resilience programme.

At ITSM Connect, we look at complex systems through the lens of reliability, risk, and continuity. Europe’s energy system is one of the biggest “service platforms” on the continent. And like any platform, it’s only as strong as its architecture, governance, and ability to withstand disruption.

The security problem: dependence creates leverage

Europe has carried a structural vulnerability for decades: heavy reliance on imported fossil fuels. Even after the peak of the 2022 energy crisis, the EU still spent around EUR 375 billion in 2024 on fossil fuel imports.

That number isn’t just an economic statistic. It represents:

·       Exposure to global price volatility

·       Dependence on external suppliers and transport routes

·       Strategic leverage for hostile or unstable actors

·       A persistent outflow of capital that could otherwise fund domestic resilience

When energy is imported, security is outsourced. When energy is produced domestically—especially from renewables—security becomes more controllable.

The geopolitical lesson: energy can be weaponised

The EU’s recent history has made the security dimension unambiguous. Russia’s weaponisation of energy supplies demonstrated how quickly energy dependence can become a tool of pressure.

The EU response—through coordinated diversification and the REPowerEU agenda—has already produced measurable results:

·       Russian gas imports fell from 45% (2021) to 19% (2024) and 12% (2025, until August).

·       Russian oil imports dropped from 27% (early 2022) to 3% (first half of 2025).

·       Russian coal imports have been completely phased out.

This is what security progress looks like in practice: fewer single points of failure, less exposure to coercion, and more predictable planning for governments and industry.

Security isn’t only supply—it’s system design

A key message in the EU’s Energy Union agenda is that security is not only about where energy comes from, but also about whether the system can deliver it reliably across borders.

Europe’s electricity system is still not fully integrated. Limited cross-border capacity and bottlenecks can lead to regional price spikes and prevent cheap clean electricity from flowing to where it’s needed most.

From a systems perspective, incomplete integration creates:

·       Fragility (local disruptions have outsized impact)

·       Inefficiency (clean power is curtailed while other regions pay more)

·       Uneven resilience (some Member States remain more exposed than others)

The numbers underline the stakes:

·       Cross-border electricity trade already delivers around EUR 34 billion in consumer benefits each year.

·       Deeper market integration could raise benefits to EUR 40–43 billion annually by 2030.

·       Grid inefficiencies such as redispatch cost about EUR 5.2 billion per year today, potentially rising to EUR 26 billion per year by 2030 if not addressed.

Security, affordability, and competitiveness converge on the same requirement: a more integrated, better planned, better governed grid.

The new security infrastructure: grids, interconnectors, storage, and digital control

In the past, Europe’s energy security was defined by pipelines, ports, and fuel contracts. In the next decade, it will be defined by:

·       Electricity grids (transmission and distribution)

·       Cross-border interconnectors

·       Flexibility and storage (batteries, demand response, other non-fossil flexibility)

·       Digitalisation and control systems (including cybersecurity)

This is why the EU is putting political and financial weight behind grid modernisation. The proposed Multiannual Financial Framework for 2028–2034 (EUR 1.98 trillion) includes a fivefold increase in the Connecting Europe Facility budget for cross-border energy infrastructure—an explicit signal that grids are now strategic assets.

Policy initiatives reinforce this direction:

·       An Energy Union Task Force to coordinate Member States and stakeholders on interconnectivity, storage, digitalisation, preparedness, and grid planning.

·       A forthcoming European Grids Package intended to accelerate grid build-out, streamline permitting, improve cost-sharing, and strengthen cross-border planning.

Storage: the missing resilience layer

Storage is a security issue because it reduces exposure to volatility and improves system stability.

Even with record growth, EU battery energy storage capacity stood at about 61 GWh in 2024. Some estimates suggest the EU needs 200 GW of storage deployed by 2030.

The exact pathway can be debated, but the direction is clear: without major flexibility and storage, a renewables-heavy system can face higher balancing costs and greater stress during peak demand or low generation periods.

Security of supply: progress, and a new threat landscape

Europe’s near-term security of supply has improved, supported by diversification and strong storage performance.

·       Gas storage reached 90% before the end of August 2024.

·       Security of supply was maintained despite a cold winter and relatively low LNG availability.

·       The EU managed the end of Russian gas transit through Ukraine without EU-wide price or supply disruption.

But the threat model is changing.

As the system electrifies and becomes more interconnected, critical infrastructure risk increases. Undersea cables, interconnectors, and digital control systems become high-value targets.

A concrete example was the disruption of the Estlink-2 submarine power cable (Finland–Estonia) in December 2024. Supply remained secure, but the incident highlighted the vulnerability of undersea assets. In response, the Commission adopted a Joint Communication in February 2025 to strengthen submarine cable security across four pillars: prevention, detection, response, and deterrence.

Extreme weather is another accelerating risk. Events such as major storms and the Iberian blackout (28 April 2025) underline why resilience planning, emergency restoration capability, and system-wide preparedness must be treated as core components of energy policy.

Energy efficiency: the quiet security multiplier

Energy efficiency is often framed as a cost-saving tool. It is also a strategic security lever.

Every 1% improvement in energy efficiency is associated with a 2.6% reduction in gas imports. That’s a direct reduction in exposure to external supply shocks.

Efficiency also reduces the scale of infrastructure required. The less energy the system needs to deliver, the easier it is to keep it stable, affordable, and resilient.

Electrification: the next security challenge is scale

Europe’s decarbonisation pathway requires deeper electrification. Yet electricity’s share of final energy demand has remained flat at around 23% for over a decade.

To meet the EU’s objectives, electrification needs to rise to around 32% by 2030 and 50% by 2040. That implies:

·       More than doubling generation capacity by 2040 (especially when accounting for electricity needed to produce hydrogen)

·       Massive grid and flexibility investment—around EUR 1 trillion in grids and flexibility by 2040 is referenced in the EU’s forward-looking outlook

This is a security agenda as much as a climate agenda: the system must scale quickly without compromising reliability.

What this means for organisations: resilience becomes a board-level energy topic

For businesses and public services, energy security is becoming a continuity planning issue. The transition will reshape:

·       Cost structures (through electrification and long-term contracts)

·       Operational risk (exposure to outages and price spikes)

·       Compliance and reporting (energy and climate governance)

·       Cyber and physical security requirements (critical infrastructure dependencies)

The organisations that navigate this well will treat energy as a strategic dependency—mapped, monitored, and managed like any other critical service.

Bottom line: clean energy is Europe’s security strategy

Europe’s energy transition is entering a decisive phase. The question is no longer whether renewables are desirable, but whether the system can be built fast enough—and resilient enough—to protect citizens and industry.

A robust Energy Union—integrated grids, faster permitting, more storage, stronger governance, and sustained investment—turns clean energy into a security guarantee: fewer import dependencies, less exposure to coercion, and a power system designed to withstand both geopolitical shocks and climate-driven disruption.

For Europe, clean energy is not only about reaching climate targets. It’s about building a system that can’t be turned against us—and that keeps the lights on, no matter what happens next.